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10	 Revisiting	field	theory
On taking Bourdieu to envisioned 
futures
Doris Hanappi1
Introduction
The question of how social forces intersect with human conduct has puzzled social 
scientists for centuries. The founders of American and European sociology wel-
comed the emphasis on the impact of social forces as the research programme for 
sociology. In the early twentieth century, such emphasis matched well the efforts 
to ‘institutionalise’ sociology as an academic discipline and in parallel distinguish 
it from behavioural psychology. Behaviourists consider human conduct as result-
ing from precisely controllable stimulus–response events. Similar to behaviourism 
in this respect, neoclassical theories have not sufficiently accounted for social 
forces in human conduct. Rather, they stayed locked into a mechanistic conception 
of economic and social processes (Mirowski 1991). This mechanistic view is 
embedded in an institutional structure in which empirical evidence provides the 
make- up for a Kabuki dance, i.e. an event that is designed to create the appearance 
of conflict or uncertainty where outcomes are decided upon beforehand. As a cri-
tique to such mechanistic view, the work of Pierre Bourdieu has stimulated new 
interest in the intersection between social forces and human behaviour. His concept 
of field has become a leading reference in the growing literature on theories of 
human action and social context.
 This chapter is dedicated to revisiting Bourdieu’s concept of field as a frame-
work to link the wider social context, social relations, and cognitions without 
analytically merging them. Its aim is to show the position of the concept of field 
with respect to major schools of sociological thought, and in particular to the 
embeddedness tradition which also addresses similar questions on the social 
structuring of human conduct. This debate goes counter to the way that meth-
odological individualism is used in economics. In what follows, the discussion 
will focus on key authors of an embeddedness approach, such as Marc Granovet-
ter (1985) and Karl Polanyi (1944, 2001), whose arguments on social relations 
and structural regulation of action seem most valuable to show in what way 
economists and social scientists may have full gain if adopting a Bourdieusian 
field perspective for their analysis of human behaviour.
 By ‘embedding action’ in social structures and processes, economic sociolo-
gists and also some heterodox economists have repeatedly elaborated in their 
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works on what one can label the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions 
of human action (Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Dobbin 2004; Beckert 2009). 
Whereas structural and relational forces reflect the idea that social action is 
embedded in pre- given social structures and networks, the argument of existing 
cognitive forces is that only the individual can interpret what goes on in the 
social world (Granovetter and Swedberg 2011). Empirical applications in 
network analysis do show either how the structure of action is conceived or how 
external factors influence the action processes ongoing within networks and 
finally to relate these to certain outcomes (e.g. flow of information, distribution 
of power in networks). The subsequent section addresses continuity and change 
of fields. It builds on previous arguments that the field notion provides a frame-
work that accounts for mediating field effects on behavioural outcomes, and at 
the same time enables scholars to address field opportunities and constraints 
which are mediated by human conduct (Swartz and Zolberg 2005). The notion 
of habitus is revisited by focusing on the role of imagination as a key to better 
understand the intersection between field and human behaviour. John Dewey’s 
study of moral imagination is central in this respect – in particular as concerns 
the sociology of habit and its malleability. Even if Bourdieu was sceptical 
towards moral or normative explanations as found, among others, in Dewey’s 
works, his explanations of the malleability of the habitus deserve some reflection 
about possible parallels and to question how agents seize upon possible new 
relations for thought and action from social, unconscious experience (that shapes 
their ‘practical sense’ embodied in the habitus) on the one hand, and from their 
conscious physical experience on the other hand.
Bourdieu’s	field	notion	as	critical	response	to	the	
embeddedness	tradition
The notion of field grows out of Bourdieu’s attempt to address the following 
question: How do social forces influence human action? More precisely, how do 
social forces mould human conduct even to the point of reproducing regular pat-
terns by generating new ones? With the concept of field, Bourdieu developed an 
important theoretical framework. Its origins are directly linked to Bourdieu’s 
later strategy of situating himself in the French intellectual world in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, and of developing a critical distance vis- à-vis purveyors of 
other traditions, such as behaviourism (Skinner 1953; Watson 1924), structural-
ism (Lévi-Strauss 1947, 1958), and existentialism (e.g. Sartre 1943) or, more 
generally speaking, narrow forms of materialism and idealism (see also Pinto 
2002). A main argument in Bourdieu’s field theory is that individual action is for 
the most part not conditioned by some stimulus–response sequence.2 Rather, 
human behaviour is fundamentally motivated by a continuous (re-)enactment of 
past learning that is adaptive to external structures as well as constitutive of the 
field itself. As such he also distinguishes himself from the structuralism of Lévi-
Strauss that lacks agency, and in particular the generative power of human 
conduct. For Bourdieu, fields do not only structure human conduct but are 
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Revisiting field theory  163
 constituted by the fundamental human capacity of its agents to see and generate 
new opportunities and ideas through their past experiences to present and future 
situations. At the same time, Bourdieu takes distance vis- à-vis Sartre’s existen-
tialism, because he rejects analyses accounting for behaviours only in terms of 
reasons and wills (Bourdieu 1987a trans. Wacquant 1990).
 On these grounds, one may expect similarities between Bourdieu’s field 
theory and embeddedness approaches, which are familiar to most economists. 
Because Bourdieu’s theory of fields suggests a way to link social structures and 
relations to human agency, Polanyi’s structural approach and Granovetter’s 
relational approach to embeddedness are of particular interest to show why 
economists and social scientists will all gain if adopting a field perspective. I 
will develop this argument by looking first at the two conceptions of embedded-
ness and show how Bourdieu’s field notion differs from and eventually goes 
beyond these conceptions, especially when cognitions and its link to the wider 
macro- structures are considered. The concept of embeddedness was first invoked 
by Karl Polanyi (1944, 2001), and received wider attention in the early 1980s 
with the publication of a theoretical essay by Marc Granovetter (1985). In the 
sociological discourse, purveyors of the Polanyian understanding of embedded-
ness are concerned with integrating the economy into broader social systems and 
share a focus on the mutual constitution of state and market (Polanyi 1944, 2001; 
Polanyi et al. 1957). Polanyian scholars reject the idea that markets can exist 
outside of state action, and adhere to the argument that economic actions become 
destructive when they are ‘disembedded’, or not governed by social or non- 
economic authorities. What partly exempts Polanyi’s concept from a strict socio-
logical critique of the neoclassical model of economic action is his acceptance of 
the generic notion of homo economicus as (historically specific) institutionally 
based.
 Instead, the Granovetterian understanding of embeddedness involves identi-
fying the relational basis of social action in economic contexts. In his view, 
transactions are entangled in a net of personal relationships that explain eco-
nomic action (Granovetter and Swedberg 2011). A Granovetterian embedded-
ness approach rejects the homo economicus in its purely determinist version that 
disallows any influence of social structure and social relations. Granovetter went 
even so far as to say that ‘behaviour and social institutions are so constrained by 
ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous mis-
understanding’ (Granovetter 1985: 482). The Granovetterian conception of 
embeddedness was empirically tested by using network analysis, which exam-
ines the structure of relationships between social entities. Nevertheless, network 
analysis focused on ‘objective structures’ rather than on social content and sub-
jective expectations. One prominent exception is Brian Uzzi (1997, 1996), for 
instance, who stressed the quality of network connections by differentiating 
between ‘arm’s length ties’, i.e. corresponding to anonymous market exchange, 
and ‘embedded ties’ based on enduring exchange relationships shaped around 
non- market ties. In this regard, Uzzi discussed trust between parties, in- depth 
information transfer, and joint problem- solving. We should not omit works 
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dealing with the polyvalent nature of networks, which draw attention to potential 
limits of beneficial effects – for instance, when connections turn into a liability; 
or the work of Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993), who studied network comple-
mentarity in immigrant economies, in particular the impact of network closure 
on credit circulation and on individual mobility. Moreover, Fuhse and Mützel 
(2010) introduced the idea of cognitive structures, i.e. agents’ interpretative 
frames by which they assign meaning to their connections depending on the 
wider structural and cultural context of their networks.
 For Bourdieu, networks represent the analytical aspect of fields which are 
made of temporary or durable relations, formal and also informal relations. In 
his field concept, he ascribes power and meaning to the ‘objective structures’ of 
fields so that he calls networks parts of a field. According to his perspective, 
fields are not only comprised of relations within them, but also of relations 
between and across fields. In modern societies, the social space is made up of a 
number of relatively autonomous but often hierarchically ordered social micro-
cosms, or spaces of objective relations in which specific logics prevail that are a 
necessity and irreducible to those that regulate other fields e.g. the economic 
field, or the artistic field. While fields are also governed by the general laws (e.g. 
reproduction, hierarchisation), which are stable laws of functioning, each field 
defines itself partly by specific interests which do not necessarily correspond to 
the interests of other fields (Bourdieu 1993b trans. Wacquant and Farage 1994). 
We find in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1992) a definition of fields as 
networks in which Bourdieu points on the one hand to the objective relations of 
positions constitutive of fields, and on the other hand, introduces the dimension 
of power, or the regulative role of power derived from the distribution of 
capitals.
In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of 
objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively 
defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their 
occupants, agents, or institutions, by the present and potential situation 
(situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in 
the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domina-
tion, subordination, homology, etc.).
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 trans. Wacquant 1992: 97)
Implicit to this definition is the assumption of an underlying symbolic process as 
part of the conversion of capital to power. For Bourdieu and Wacquant fields are 
spaces of objective relations between ‘positions defi ned by their rank in the dis-
tribution of competing powers or species of capital’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992 trans. Wacquant 1992: 114). Therefore, fields are different from networks 
since the latter is understood as the mere manifestation of these objective rela-
tions. Similarly, Martin (2003) describes fields as a topological space of posi-
tions, a field of relational forces, and a battlefield of contestation. With the latter, 
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Revisiting field theory  165
Martin refers to the political dimension of battlefields, which is manifested by a 
struggle for power to improve one’s position. Bourdieu defends the idea that 
human action is adaptive to and embedded in fields, but to be sure, it is not 
entirely determined by it. While network approaches, and particularly com-
parative and historical approaches in economic sociology, argue that institutions 
generate meaning for people and to this extent determine action, Bourdieu sets 
against such explanation a notion of field that opens possibilities to action. More 
precisely, economics and social science scholars adopting a Bourdieusian field 
perspective would need to consider actors as not being forced by their social sur-
rounding into their choices neither as conforming to rules externally imposed on 
them. Rather, these actors engage in a ‘game’ whose rules orient action. Implicit 
in this ‘game’ metaphor Bourdieu often used is the political dimension of fields 
in which agency is assumed to be subject to a struggle for power.
 The Bourdieusian agents enter a field of relational forces well aware that they 
will have to struggle, negotiate, bargain to advance their positions within the 
existing field- specific power structures (Swartz and Zolberg 2005). As they 
struggle for power, their behaviour gets structured by the field but at the same 
time their conduct becomes constitutive of the future field structure. In order to 
describe this process, Bourdieu used the language ‘structured structures’ and 
‘structuring structures’ representing his view of the relationship between the 
individual and society. While society shapes the individual habitus through 
socialisation, the very continuity and evolution of society depends on the perma-
nent actions of individuals. Bourdieu describes this in Outline of a Theory of 
Practice as follows:
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the 
generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without any way being the product of 
obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing 
a conscious aiming at ends [. . .].
(Bourdieu 1972b trans. Nice 1977: 72)
Games, likewise, order play through rules and players invest in the game and 
agree by their belief that the game is worth playing. These analogies serve to 
explain two behavioural mechanisms: on the one hand, the resorting to common 
practices which have their grounding in the past following the behavioural prin-
ciples individuals derive from incorporated knowledge and beliefs; and on the 
other hand, strategic improvisation (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). The strengths each individual can put into the game depend on the 
value and meaning of the types of capital.3
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Structural,	relational,	and	cognitive	explanations	of	action	in	
field	theory
There is more to social contexts than its converging effects with past field struc-
tures. Economists and social scientists adopting a Bourdieusian perspective have 
to employ two main concepts to understand action and how it is moulded by 
field structures: capital and habitus (the element of agency). Bourdieu identifies 
what Widick calls two moments: first, there is an objective moment referring to 
the power- laden structure and patterned systems of objective forms, objects 
(capitals), positions, and action that constitute groups and institutions; second, 
there is a subjective moment (which is organised under the term habitus) used by 
Bourdieu to locate individuals into the social context by interlinking them in a 
kind of dialectic of cognitive and social structures. This dialectic consists in the 
encounter of individuals and their opportunities as the objective conditions of 
possibility of action. Widick (2005) argues in psychological terms, that the ‘self 
is mediated by the social that shapes expressions of the subjective commitment 
to the external dimension of lived institutions that order, structure, and constitute 
the world of collective necessity’ (Widick 2005: 199). Whereas the view that 
action takes place within social order is also shared by most embeddedness 
scholars, their conceptions on the underlying forces are different (Granovetter 
1985). We may say that Bourdieu sees ‘social power’ as the main element of the 
structure and logic of any given field and thus attributes high importance to 
the role of conflicts over resources that shape the functioning of the field, and in the 
end decide upon who gets what.
Capital and power in field theory
The dimension of power is central to Bourdieu’s relational analysis of behavi-
oural outcomes and transformation processes of fields. People’s power depends 
on the amount and configuration of resources and the extent to which these 
resources are valued in a field. Ultimately these resources affect their disposi-
tions to act, their strategies, and the way they impact on common practices. 
Bourdieu has identified different kinds of capital – educational capital, social 
capital (such as useful contacts and networks), technological capital (such as 
innovative technical equipment), commercial capital (such as brands), and 
organisational capital (such as a firm’s reputation) (Bourdieu 1979 trans. Nice 
1986). He distinguished cultural, technical, and commercial capital as the objec-
tivised capital (equipment, instruments), from those embodied kinds, such as 
personal competencies and skills.
 Since people do not act in a social vacuum, fields are competitive arenas. The 
idea of competition is much less prominent in network approaches, where 
network connectors in similar positions would rather be considered redundant. 
The strength an individual can compete with, or more generally the possibilities 
of action an individual has, depend to some part on the stock of capital. Fields 
are characterised by heterogeneity of its agents differently equipped with capital 
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Revisiting field theory  167
(Bourdieu 2005a). Not only is the stock of total capital important (i.e. its volume, 
or total amount), but also its structure (i.e. the relative proportions of the dif-
ferent types of capital). For instance, firms with similar total stocks of capital 
can occupy dissimilar positions if the share of the diverse forms of capital (e.g. 
economic, cultural capitals) is different between firms – see, for instance, in this 
volume, Chapter 11, written by Fabien Eloire. The basic idea of how fields are 
structured can well be illustrated by one quote from a book chapter published in 
Principles of an Economic Anthropology, where Bourdieu describes the struc-
ture and capital distribution of the specific field of the market as follows:
The structure of the distribution of capital and the structure of the distribu-
tion of costs, itself linked mainly to the scale and degree of vertical integra-
tion, determine the structure of the field, that is to say, the relations of force 
among firms: the mastery of a very large proportion of capital (of the overall 
energy) in effect confers a power over the field, and hence over the firms 
less well endowed (relatively) in terms of capital; it also governs the price 
of entry into the field and the distribution of opportunities for profit.
(Bourdieu 2000b trans. Turner 2005: 76)
The concept of field posits that the distinctive value attributed to capitals remains 
marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition. Capitals whose transmission is 
‘best hidden’, receive higher weight in the reproduction of the field than direct, 
tangible forms that are more strongly controlled.4
 One type of capital that is also prominent in network approaches, and that has 
been mentioned earlier in this volume, is social capital, which comprises the 
totality of resources, including financial capital and information, that may be 
activated through a ‘more or less mobilisable network of relations that procures 
advantage by providing higher returns on investment’ (Bourdieu 2005a). In other 
words, we may consider the volume of an agent’s social capital as dependent on 
the size of the network of connections that the individual can mobilise, and on 
the volume of capital possessed by the other members to whom the agent is 
connected.
 In a field theoretic view, struggle is symbolic because agents attribute certain 
value to capital. The definition of social capital makes this abundantly clear. 
Social capital involves relationships of mutual recognition and knowledge. As a 
power in terms of brand loyalty, or commitment to a firm in the case of 
employees, symbolic capital functions as a form of credit that presupposes trust 
and belief of those upon which it bears because they are supposed to grant it cre-
dence. The extent to which capital can be converted in a field adheres to common 
laws of conversion and of securing field functioning (reproduction). For instance, 
in markets which are sub- fields of the economic field, manpower can be con-
verted into financial capital, and its rate of conversion highly depends on whether 
it serves to secure the firm’s and the overall market functioning.
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Opportunities, interpretation, and imagination
The basic idea of field struggle is that individuals try to stabilise or improve their 
positions in the field by using their capital (Boyer 2008). They may influence the 
functioning of the field – holding back, maintaining expectation, or hustling and 
surprising – to exert power (Bourdieu 1981). For instance, if a group could use 
its social capital to exploit some of its properties that could serve as (symbolic) 
capital in the new state of the field, then they would be able to modify the rules 
of the game to their advantage. This vision is well expressed in Principles of an 
Economic Anthropology, in which Bourdieu argues that interactions depend on 
indirect conflict, on the socially constructed structure of the relationships of 
force that agents modify through those resources they control (Bourdieu 2005a).
 Bourdieu holds the view that the conflict over structure by virtue of the 
volume and structure of the capitals at hand shapes the space of opportunities of 
action. However, the idea that this space constrains the choices of strategies 
(Fligstein 2001a; Bourdieu 1972b trans. Nice 1977) would not separate the agent 
from the field, rather it is said to inscribe the actor into the field logic who 
follows written scripts he can do little about. This would emphasise a ‘taken for 
granted’ reality, a routine social order and reproduction in which all actors share 
the same perceptions of their opportunities and constraints. Therefore, Bourdieu 
and even more so Fligstein and McAdam (2011) avoid this pitfall to reduce the 
field actor to a ‘socialised cipher’ (Widick 2005). In contrast, for them, field 
actors constantly adjust to the conditions in the field given their position and the 
action of others. Fligstein and McAdam (2011: 7) define ‘strategic action as an 
attempt by social actors to create and maintain stable social worlds by securing 
cooperation of others’. He emphasises that strategic action is about control, 
which is achieved by the creation of identities, political coalitions, and interests. 
But the ability to reach such agreements requires that actors are capable of role- 
taking.
 This idea is consistent with Bourdieu’s habitus that links any given field to 
the cognitive capacities of the agents operating within it, without confusing them 
analytically. The conception of the habitus is that of a repository of classifica-
tions, schemata of perception, dispositions, and scripts (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992 trans. Wacquant 1992). It serves as a repertoire of meanings and orients 
action structured by and synchronised with the fields. An essential point of his 
view is that individuals as social agents operate in the fields and make them 
operate insofar as ‘a field can function only if it finds individuals socially predis-
posed to behave as responsible agents, to risk their money, their time, sometimes 
their honor or their life, to pursue the games and to obtain the profits it proposes’ 
(Bourdieu 1982b: 46; trans. Adamson 1990: 194). Individuals choose strategies 
on the basis of these repertoires, which operate out of the intersection of percep-
tions, appreciation, and action inclination moulded by their past experience 
(Crossley 2001). Figure 10.1 provides a simplified illustration of the relationship 
between Bourdieu’s basic concepts of habitus, capital, field, and behavioural 
outcome. While the force of habitus is mediated by fields, the constraints and 
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Revisiting field theory  169
opportunities imposed by fields, such as its power structure and the possibilities 
they open to agents, are mediated by the dispositions of the habitus. Accounting 
for an interplay between field and habitus allows purveyors of this perspective to 
better understand how existing social structures came about, and thus go beyond 
situating or embedding action within a pre- given social context as proclaimed in 
the embeddedness tradition.
 In Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), the internalisation of external structures, 
or the somatisation of social relations, helps agents to identify and interpret their 
social environment. Field actors regress to ‘virtually prevalent situations’ within 
the body (habitus) that can be reactivated and serve as an interpretative device as 
part of the pre- logical, spontaneous logic of practical action (Widick 2005). In 
other words, individuals chose strategies out of their pool of options and on the 
basis of prior experience, both of which are shaped by their social environment 
and incorporate shared understandings.
 Emphasising the interpretative capacity is to suggest that people are always 
acting informed by the sense of the game, mostly in an unconscious way and 
with an inborn interest to practically master their lives. They construct their own 
relation to the field5 – their own personality and identity. Out of prior experi-
ence, based on values and knowledge of game rules, they derive their strategies. 
However, the habitus is subject to permanent stimulation and conditioning by 
the social process, so that it is the product of history, ‘an open system of disposi-
tions’ that is durable but not eternal; not a reflex but conditioned limited sponta-
neity (Bourdieu 2000b trans. Turner 2005). It is also consistent with this logic 
that actors with presumably an identical habitus will generate different outcomes 
because their biographical trajectory and attachment to other actors affects their 
cognitive capacity to make sense of people’s actions and environments.
Fields
Opportunities
Constraints
Capitals
Education, professional
status, cultural knowledge,
wealth, social network, etc.
Habitus Behavioural
outcome
Figure 10.1  Simplified overview of the relationship between capitals, fields, habitus, and 
behavioural outcomes.
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 Key to the idea of interpretative capacity is that individuals must be able to 
use their interpretative repertoires at any given moment. This kind of compet-
ence however requires a second capacity, which links the subject to the network 
of social relations, which is the capacity of imagination and identification 
(Widick 2005), or as Fligstein puts it, the social skill of reading people and 
environments (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). This imaginative capacity is con-
sistent with Bourdieu’s notion of the generative nature of the habitus because it 
bears the idea that strategies are oriented by the constraints and possibilities built 
into their position (Bourdieu 2000b trans. Turner 2005: 78) and by the repres-
entation the individual is able to form of that position and the position of com-
petitors. These strategies result from the information at their disposal and their 
cognitive structures (Bourdieu 2005a).
 The imaginative capacity that Bourdieu did not explicitly mention, rather his 
works refer to improvisation (Bourdieu 2000b trans. Turner 2005), bears the 
core motivation of field actors to identify themselves with others. This desire, or 
investment, and the instantaneous influence it has on the mental structure incul-
cate social typifications, categorisations, and schemata. Here, one can observe 
similarities to John Dewey (1910), one of Bourdieu’s major sources of inspira-
tion, who thought of imagination as an activity to test alternatives to resolve con-
flicting situations in thought by envisioning them to be carried out. The 
imaginative process continues until a suggested solution meets all the conditions 
of the case and does not run counter to any feature of it. Dewey calls this imagin-
ative process ‘dramatic rehearsal’, which is a taking- in of the full scope of the 
situation, including its socio- cultural meaning (Dewey 1930). It differs from 
imaginary flights of mind- wandering, which are totally separated from the 
concern of the current situation. Through imaginative activity, individuals’ per-
ception is amplified because people are able to form anticipations of the future in 
the present. This has repercussions on how a field evolves because individuals 
deliberately rehearse ways to settle difficulties or ambiguities and by doing so 
open up a situation so it is perceived in a new way. The attention Bourdieu drew 
on the individual field agent, including his capacities and potentialities in taking 
actions and by doing so contributing to the structuring of the field, goes far 
beyond socially embedded agents who build on trust and reciprocity as one of 
their core motivations of action (Granovetter and Swedberg 2011).
 Two sites of transformations are possible, the intra- subjective and inter- 
subjective sites, both of which shape the structure and logic of the field. In the 
intra- subjective site, individuals are able to imagine being the other, which trans-
forms their mental structures by the image of the other. Consequently, it creates an 
image through which later the social environment will be imagined. An example 
would be observing the successful manager in a company; the observer lives 
through this other – being part of his or her career in an instance of identification 
that transforms the observer’s mental structures, e.g. qualifying the perception of 
one’s position and worldview relative to others. In the inter- subjective site, imagin-
ative capacity aids individuals not only to transpose themselves into others, but to 
mobilise people by identifying their ‘frames’ and those of the environment, and to 
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make them act on behalf of these frames (Fligstein 2001b). By doing so, they need 
to take distance from their own and the group’s interest, and consider multiple 
interests which are socially constructed to converge strategies for shared views 
with wider ranging structural effects (e.g. social movements).
Permissiveness	of	fields
Coming back to Bourdieu, he suggests that individuals who imagine futures 
form implicit understandings about how competition is dealt with, what roles 
and internal hierarchy and interests a field has. If these understandings are under-
mined, fields become permissive to change. Indeed, in turbulent times, strategic-
ally acting individuals, which in Bourdieu’s conception can be powerfully 
generative and innovative, challenge and question the rules and positions gov-
erning the field (Bourdieu 1980g trans. Nice 1990). A major signal of this turbu-
lent time is a high level of uncertainty. This uncertainty influences what someone 
deliberates as rational to do. It may cause non- foreseeable behaviour, which is 
not necessarily irrational. In other words, someone may show a behaviour which 
is not pre- given in its direction in the stimulus and that is not deducible from 
knowledge of the appropriate rules, even if individuals knew most of them; such 
behaviour is presumably shaped by the trace of one’s past trajectory that does 
not necessarily match existing field structure and the collective conceptions that 
control its working (Bourdieu 1997e). A mismatch between habitus and field 
often leads a field into crisis and disrupts regularities, which increases the field’s 
permissiveness to transformation, changes to the configuration of laws of func-
tioning, and tempo of transformation. Additionally, it increases changes in the 
relation between fields, which in turn may affect the overall configuration of the 
vertically and horizontally organised field structure.
 The disruption of regularities can be a consequence of a de- synchronisation 
between field and habitus, i.e. the lack of correspondence between the two 
(Florian and Hillebrandt 2006); or it can be considered as a cause for further 
field–habitus transformations (Hanappi 2011). In this sense, we recall, field 
structure inculcates the habitus, and these mental structures in turn reproduce or 
change social structures. This view is consistent with Crossley (2001), who 
explains that patterns and underlying principles of social contexts are incorpor-
ated in the habitus as both an inclination and a modus operandi. Disruption can 
often feed on itself. Individuals incorporate a generalised feeling of uncertainty 
(about threats, opportunities, and benefits of action), which leads them to ques-
tion existing laws of functioning of the field and which hinders anticipations of 
field relations (McAdam and Scott 2005). This weakens the integrative power of 
the existing laws which hold together the field, and which define its boundaries 
towards the outside world. As a consequence, the field becomes permissive as a 
response to such disruptions, and new people (with their habits) can intrude to 
change the existing logic.
 At the same time, dominant individuals attempt to safeguard or regain the 
former position and re- stabilise the former system by taking (innovative) action. 
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This brings in an almost perpetual spiral of adjustments in the objective (field) 
and mental (habitus) structures by virtue of cognitive acts. These acts include the 
recognition as reasonable of the agent’s practices and rules of thumb, and pre- 
reflexive, unconscious style on the one hand, and the practical acts of mastering 
a situation, on the other hand. In a field perspective, continuity and change are 
thus not the mere result of an innovative activity. Rather, as a result of an adjust-
ment to novel situations and the enactment of past experience, it is a highly 
interwoven dynamic between field and habitus which by nature has stabilising 
and destabilising social forces. Part of this dynamic is that individual mental 
adjustments do not just occur to the environment but of the environment and 
generate relatively independent field forces. This makes fields non- ergodic 
(North 1999) – the present means (averages) are no good proxy for future means 
– which continue to change in novel ways. Therefore, it does not put an end to 
the attempt to anticipate future possible outcomes among even the most sophist-
icated and experienced individuals.
Final	remarks
The chapter has presented approaches which embed action to help better explain 
the relationship between human conduct and the structured social context by 
referring to relational, institutional, or cognitive forces. Applications to embed 
action in networks often consider the role of institutions and cognitions as 
secondary, or inscribe action into institutional settings and take social networks 
and cognitions for granted.
 The field theory of Bourdieu has been offered as an alternative way to link 
human conduct and social structure, providing a framework to consider structu-
ral, relational, and cognitive elements together without analytically merging 
them. Bourdieu departs from the game metaphor that sees individuals in perma-
nent competition over positions and power. Their goal is to safeguard or improve 
their position in the field, by either stabilising or de- stabilising the current state 
and resorting to more or less innovative strategies. Individuals may influence the 
very rules of the field – holding back, maintaining expectation, or hustling and 
surprising – to exert power. By considering the objective moment adherent to all 
fields as the power- laden structure and patterned systems of objective forms, 
objects, positions, and action that constitute groups and institutions, the sub-
jective moment which refers to habitus in Bourdieu’s work locates competent 
agents into their objective social structure. This interrelationship between field 
and habitus is fundamental, and embodiment is an irreversible process, i.e. all 
external stimuli and conditioning experience are perceived through already con-
structed past experience.
 The idea that conflict over structure and past trajectories shapes the space of 
opportunities is however too narrow since strategic action is achieved by the cre-
ation of identities, political coalitions, and interests. In other words, cognitive 
forces are fundamental. To identify and interpret their social environment, indi-
viduals refer to internalised knowledge (not necessarily thought) that can be 
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reactivated and serve as interpretative device. Individuals build images as kind 
of representations of the other, which allows them to locate themselves in the 
social structure (out of the position they currently inhabit), and to take sufficient 
distance to identify others’ interests. These images have been argued to be 
central to link individual cognitions to social and institutional structures. They 
either confirm the general field functioning or in times of social change they 
disrupt the existing field laws, which lowers compliance with existing rules and 
renders the field permissive to change.
Notes
1 Doris Hanappi is a social scientist, specialising in work and family sociology, social 
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nomic Issues, 2011, 25(4): 785–803; ‘Field, habitus, and economic reason: prospects 
for conceptualising economic action’, LIVES Working Papers, 2011/6. The author 
acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in 
Research LIVES.
2 In some of his works, he contends at the metaphorical level that the screen the habitus 
introduces between stimulus and response is a screen of ‘time’ and that this is most 
effective in as much as no conscious reflection is involved (Bourdieu 2005a). In An 
Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, he described his understanding of this stimulus–
response relationship as follows: ‘We must think of it [the habitus] as a sort of spring 
that needs a trigger and, depending upon the stimuli and structure of the field, the very 
same habitus will generate different, even opposite, outcomes’ (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant 1992 trans. Wacquant 1992: 135).
3 A prominent scholar in American sociology who took up this field concept was Neil 
Fligstein, who used it to analyse several empirical topics, e.g. differences between 
national employment systems, or governance in the field of international relations (see 
Fligstein 2005: 183–204). In his view, field actors are confronted with different rights, 
laws, and conceptions of control, which result in the strategic practices, similar to those 
strategies resulting out of a ‘feel for the game’ as suggested by Bourdieu (see Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992 trans. Wacquant 1992).
4 Bourdieu’s view may be conceived as being rooted in an anticipation of the distinction 
between the two states of capital, the objectivised and the embodied, as spelled out in 
Thorsten Veblen’s work on the instinct of workmanship (1898).
5 At least complementary to the principle of rationality are the principles of adaptation 
and practical mastery that guide the reasonable agent in any of his or her actions. 
Bourdieu argued that an economic habitus generates behaviours that are particularly 
well- suited to those conditions from which they arise and that they tend to reproduce 
(Bourdieu 2000b trans. Turner 2005).
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